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Job Loss and Job Change: 
Discussion by the Authors 
Comment by John T. Addison and Pedro Portugal 
All three papers deal with important 
policy issues. Ruhm, whose analysis ranges 
the most widely, goes furthest in recom-
mending policy activism. Podgursky and 
Swaim (P&S) are somewhat more re -
strained, but it is clear that they too favor 
special assistance for displaced workers. In 
our  own paper  we see advantage  in 
workers being given notification of their 
impending redundancy in the specific 
context of plant closings and relocations, 
although our treatment admittedly does 
not examine the role of firm heterogene-
ity in producing the observed pattern of 
results. Nevertheless, it is the case that our 
understanding of the displaced worker 
problem remains rudimentary. 
Ignoring, for now, potentially impor-
tant problems that have to do with the 
definition of a displaced worker, our focus 
here will be on the computation of the 
earnings loss. P&S deal with before-and-
after earnings comparisons, or relative 
earnings losses. Ruhm makes a broad 
comparison of the earnings of stayers and 
m ov e rs  a n d  h a s  t h e  a dv a n t a g e  o f  a  
somewhat longer follow-up period. The 
use of a control group is advantageous in 
computing wage losses for fairly obvious 
reasons, but simple comparisons of the 
earnings of movers and stayers are mislead-
ing (see Mincer 1986). In particular, any 
estimation using a control group should 
seek to model explicitly the decision rule 
that motivates some workers to move and 
others to stay put. Another selectivity 
problem addressed by P&S, but not by 
Ruhm, concerns the selection of workers  
into employment status. We return to this 
issue below. 
Focusing for the moment on the before-
and-after approach, and recognizing as a 
possibility that the displaced could have 
higher earnings than their nondisplaced 
counterparts if not all stayers, what conclu-
sions can be drawn from the observed 
wage changes? A particularly difficult 
question concerns the sacrifice of firm- 
specific training investments. It is conven-
t ional  to  argue  that  this  loss  can be  
d i s c o v e r e d  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  p r e -  
displacement wage tenure coefficient (e.g., 
Hamermesh 1987).  But,  as Ruhm cor -
rectly notes,  tenure on the lost job is  
positively correlated with post-displace-
ment wages.  (P&S detect  a  generally 
insignificant coefficient on tenure and 
focus their attention instead on lost spe-
cific investments resulting from changes in 
industry and occupation). 
The basic  problem with the tenure 
variable is that it is incapable of distinguish-
ing between general and specific training 
investments in the case of younger work-
ers and of detect ing switching from 
specific to general training investments in 
t h e  ca se  o f  w ork e r s  w h o  e i t h e r  a re  
informed of or otherwise know about 
their impending redundancy. Our own 
work would suggest that the conventional 
measure of lost specific training invest-
ments—that is, assuming a zero effect of 
pre-displacement tenure on the new job— 
could inflate estimates of the mean earn-
ings loss by up to 45 percent (Addison and 
Portugal 1987). That said, there is still the 
issue of apparently large earnings losses  
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associated with industry and occupational 
shifts. 
There is currently much dispute over 
the meaning of the tenure coefficient in 
standard Mincerian earnings functions. 
The basic problem is that, once one 
accounts for individual and job match 
heterogeneity,1 the partial effect of tenure 
on wages is small; instead, general labor 
market experience (coupled with purpo-
sive mobility) accounts for the bulk of 
wage growth over a career. Unfortunately, 
this argument raises a new set of problems 
for computing earnings losses from dis-
placement—although it does suggest other 
rationales for the contribution of tenure 
on the first job to post-displacement 
earnings—since the returns to a good job 
match, no less than to firm-specific invest-
ments, may be dissipated by displacement. 
Much more work is urgently required 
on the tenure-earnings relation. Indeed, 
the outcome of such work might offer 
stronger support for the labor market 
segmentation argument advanced byRuhm 
than does his own evidence. That evidence 
is rather poor. Notably, the argument that 
women and blacks gain less from mobility 
than do white men can hardly be said to 
provide evidence of labor market segmen-
tation. Furthermore, the race variable is 
never significant in the mover sample and 
the composition of the female sample is 
simply too restrictive to permit any gen-
eral statement. 
Of the three studies, only ours specifi-
cally examines unemployment duration. 
One aspect of our inquiry calls into 
question the uncritical use of an unemploy-
ment insurance variable as a regressor in 
the wage or duration equations. P&S, on 
the other hand, do consider the selection 
of workers into employment status in 
formulating their selectivity argument. 
For example, if more able workers are more 
stable and receive higher wages on account of their 
greater ability, then failing to take this association into 
account will upwardly bias the return to tenure. 
Similar bias arises from good jobs paying higher 
wages than others, which will reduce the likelihood 
of quits; and from some job matches being better 
than others, the reward for which also reduces 
turnover.  
(They do not, however, seek to correct the 
wage equation for selection into labor 
force status.) P&S obtain a negative selec-
tivity coefficient, as have other researchers 
in the field. We are sympathetic to their 
conclusion that the negative coefficient is 
spurious. Unemployment duration has 
opposing influences on wage offers, inten-
sifying search effort on the one hand, but 
stigmatizing the searcher and depreciat-
ing human capital, on the other. Of the 
two influences, the latter is likely to 
dominate. 
Note, too, that there is a reverse line of 
causation running from wage offers to 
unemployment duration. The effect of 
wage offers on duration of unemployment 
could well dominate. More generally, we 
would argue that the sign of the selectivity 
coefficient is sensitive to specification, 
namely, the use of reduced-form versus 
structural-form equations and the defini-
tion of the dependent variable (e.g., wage 
level, change in wages, or—the intermedi-
ate case—displacement wage as a function 
of the pre-displacement wage). 
Other complications in the computation 
of earnings loss concern severance pay 
and other separation settlements, the 
existence of rents on the pre-displacement 
job, and lost training investments by the 
firm (a flat tenure-earnings profile is, of 
course, consistent with substantial firm- 
financed investments). The force of the 
severance pay argument is in one sense 
balanced by lost pension and fringe 
entitlements. In neither case do we have 
data. But, to the extent that certain types of 
job losses are accurately predicted, sever-
ance pay may be an important form of ex 
post compensation. In other cases of more 
predictable job loss, the pre-displacement 
wage may compensate workers ex ante. 
Clearly, as is implicit in all three papers, 
there is no reason for us to be concerned 
with lost monopoly rents. At issue is the 
scale or even the existence of such rents. 
One flimsy clue as to the existence of rents 
might be the regression toward the mean 
detected by P&S. A better indication, 
however, would be given by the coeffici-
ent on an appropriately specified union 
membership variable. The issue of  
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lost firm-financed training is relevant 
because it highlights the difficulties posed 
by any compensation principle. 
If earnings net of monopoly rents are 
not compensated by the market, if the 
worker-financed firm-specific component 
of earnings is large, and if the size of the 
displaced worker population is substantial, 
then an efficiency argument may be 
advanced for some form of ex post 
compensation in the form of, say, lump- 
sum payments or retraining allowances. 
But the full facts of the case have yet to be 
documented. This uncertainty inhibits the  
formulation of precise policy recommen-
dations. 
The three studies do prOVide us with 
more information on displaced workers, 
even if they raise rather more questions 
than they answer. Support for new sweep-
ing policy initiatives is not yet indicated, 
although one paper makes a case for 
advance notification and all contribute 
materially to the analysis of the conse-
quences of displacement. As is conven-
tional, we have tended to focus here on 
points of disagreement or lack of clarity 
and not on matters about which there is 
general agreement. 
Comment by Michael Podgursky and Paul Swaim 
Policy discussions of plant shutdowns 
and job displacement have proceeded 
largely in the absence of reliable data. As 
recently as 1983, congressional hearings 
on structural unemployment produced 
estimates of the number of dislocated 
workers that ranged from 100,000 to 
three million and widely divergent assess-
ments of the adjustment difficulties that 
result from permanent job loss (U.S. 
Congress 1984). These three articles at-
tempt to fill some of the gaps in our 
knowledge of the incidence and economic 
effects of job displacement. 
Our paper and Ruhm's, based though 
they are on two very different micro data 
files, report surprisingly similar results. 
We both find that average earnings losses 
following displacement are modest—on 
the order of 10 percent—but that the 
dispersion is very high, with a sizable 
minority of displaced workers experienc-
ing very large reductions in earnings. 
Furthermore, both studies show that most 
losses persist for at least five years. 
Although Addison and Portugal do not 
emphasize the variation in weeks of 
joblessness following displacement, we 
have shown elsewhere that such variation 
is pronounced, and that workers who are 
jobless for a long period tend to suffer the 
largest earnings losses once reemployed  
(Podgursky and Swaim 1987). These sev-
eral findings dearly show that many 
displaced workers suffer considerable ad-
justment difficulties. 
The findings reported in the two papers 
on earnings (ours and Ruhm's) do differ 
in a number of respects, but these 
differences seem largely attributable to 
differences in the data sets used. For 
example, Ruhm's female sample—mostly 
poor heads of households—generally 
were not adversely affected by 
displacement, whereas our more 
representative sample of displaced 
women experienced larger median losses 
than men. 
One strength of the PSID data used by 
Ruhm is that the earnings trajectory of 
displaced workers can be directly com-
pared to that of nondisplaced workers. 
The 1984 Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), 
which we used, lacks retrospective data for 
nondisplaced workers, but has the advan-
tage of being more current, more repre-
sentative of the national work force, and, 
perhaps, more precise in distinguishing 
displaced workers from workers dis-
charged for cause. Both articles also 
present findings that are not easily recon-
ciled with market-clearing, which suggests 
that future research on displaced workers 
might utilize efficiency wage models or 
other models of job rationing. 
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In their analysis of duration of jobless-
ness, Addison and Portugal conclude that 
advance notice significantly reduces ex-
pected spell lengths, but that this effect is 
greatly reduced in the presence of unem-
ployment insurance benefits.1 These find-
ings must be viewed with caution. As the 
authors correctly note, some workers 
answering "yes" to the "advance notice" 
question may not have received formal 
notice of impending layoff, but merely 
expected to be laid off. A negative answer 
to this question, however, is also ambigu-
ous. As can be seen in their Table 1, 10.8 
percent of the presumably surprised "no" 
group reported zero weeks of joblessness, 
as compared to 15.8 per cent of the 
forewarned "yes" group. We suspect that 
some of the former group were not 
completely surprised and initiated job 
search before the shutdown. Nonetheless, 
the finding that a rough measure of 
advance notice is associated with shorter 
jobless spells is certainly of policy interest. 
Although Addison and Portugal state 
their findings carefully, a casual reader 
might conclude from their article that 
unemployment insurance largely elimi-
nates the positive effect of advance notice 
on jobless duration. No such inference can 
be drawn, since the dummy variable for 
receipt of UI benefits (BEN) is so clearly 
endogenous. As their Table 1 shows, 
advance notice increases the probability of 
zero weeks of joblessness, but has no 
discernible effect for workers with positive 
jobless spells. Workers helped by advance 
notice are thus not unemployed long 
enough to collect UI, even though most of 
1.  We label the dependent variable the duration of 
joblessness rather than unemployment, since the 
relevant question on the DWS did not refer to active 
job search. (The survey question read "Since [the 
worker] left that job, how many weeks was [the 
worker] without work?") The reported spells may 
thus include intervals that would normally be 
classified as labor force withdrawal. Although weeks 
of joblessness may overstate weeks of unemployment, 
it may understate total search time, since it excludes 
search prior to job loss.  
them surely would have become eligible 
had they remained unemployed longer. 
The fact that a worker received UI 
benefits (i.e., BEN = 1) thus indicates that 
advance notice failed to save that worker 
from unemployment, but it does not 
follow that UI was responsible for that 
failure. 
This simultaneity problem is com-
pounded when interactions between BEN 
and other independent variables are added 
to the model. For example, years of tenure 
on the former job (TENURE) acquires a 
significant negative coefficient when 
BEN*TENURE is added to the model. The 
coefficient for tenure, however, now reg-
isters the combined effect of at least one 
year of job tenure (hence likely eligibility 
for UI) and nonreceipt of UI by the 
worker. Not surprisingly, this combination 
is very strongly associated with short spells 
of joblessness, but what is the economic 
significance of this association? Again, 
BEN = 1 is serving primarily as a proxy for 
at least two weeks of joblessness, and 
its coefficient is not a measure of the 
impact of the UI system on job search. 
The January 1984 DWS was the first 
large national data file designed to iden-
tify displaced workers. These papers, and 
others published and circulating, show 
what a valuable statistical resource it repre-
sents. We are pleased that a similar survey 
was repeated in January 1986 and another 
is scheduled in January 1988.2 We hope 
the 1988 survey will be further revised 
and extended to provide more useful 
information on important policy variables, 
such as the receipt and length of advance 
notice, UI eligibility, and duration of 
unemployment. The impending availabil-
ity of so much new information on 
displacement guarantees many more stud-
ies on this important topic, and further 
tests of the findings of the three papers 
presented here. 
2 In addition to these household surveys, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics has also begun reporting 
establishment data on mass layoffs and plant closings 
based on state UI claims data. See U.S. Department 
of Labor (1987). 
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Comment by Christopher J. Ruhm 
The papers in this volume, along with 
recent related work, provide much new 
information and contain important lessons 
for researchers and policy makers. Five 
"stylized facts" on the causes and conse-
quences of labor mobility have emerged. 
(1) Although blue-collar and manufactur-
ing workers are most likely to experience 
permanent layoffs, labor displacement 
occurs in all sectors of the economy and all 
types of workers are at risk. (2) There is a 
wide variance in post-layoff adjustment 
patterns, with most workers experiencing 
small income losses or modest improve-
ments in wages, but a significant minority 
suffering large reductions in compensa-
tion and extended unemployment. (3) 
Among that minority, some workers' wage 
losses prOVe to be transitory, but for most 
the wage loss persists for several years. (4) 
There are important differences among 
demographic groups in post-layoff adjust-
ment patterns. In particular, nonwhites 
and women experience greater difficulties 
than whites and men. (5) Prior notification 
of impending permanent layoffs is associ-
ated with modest reductions in future 
joblessness, but the reasons for that associ-
ation are unclear. 
Podgursky and Swaim's (P&S) paper 
complements and improves upon earlier 
work using the 1984 Displaced Worker 
Survey (DWS). Their findings of wide 
variances in displacement outcomes and 
severe adjustment difficulties for non-
whites and women closely accord with the 
results of my paper. Since the two studies 
cover different time periods and data 
sources, this consistency justifies consider-
able confidence in the results. 
P&S should be applauded for including 
short-tenure workers in their analysis, 
rather than following the example of some 
other researchers who have eliminated 
workers with less than three years' senior-
ity in the preseparation job. Defining 
displacement in terms of previous senior-
ity is dangerously restrictive, given that 
displaced workers may have recently left a 
job of longer duration, and recent evi  
dence calls into question the extent to 
which adjustment problems increase with 
tenure.1 
Some of P&S's results must be qualified 
by limitations in the DWS. Because that 
source provides no information on previ-
ous wages or employment conditions for 
workers not experiencing displacement, 
P&S are forced to use occupation and 
sector wage trends when estimating the 
earnings changes of displaced workers. 
Similarly, their measure of the persistence 
of wage changes requires the assumption 
that similar types of workers were released 
in each year between 1979 and 1984. 
Fluctuating economic conditions during 
the period cast doubt upon this assump-
tion. 
I am more concerned, however, with 
the interpretation of the regression re-
sults. P&S argue that the observed nega-
tive correlation between previous wages 
and post-displacement wage growth im-
plies that workers with substantial human 
capital lose the most from displacement. 
Given that education, experience, and 
seniority have been controlled for, it is 
more likely that high previous wages 
imply positive error terms (the luck of 
finding a relatively high-paying job). To 
the extent that preseparation wages con-
tain a random disturbance, some regres-
sion to the mean is virtually inevitable. 
P&S's interpretation of the negative sign 
on the inverse Mill's ratio is particularly 
questionable. Although I suspect that 
high-paying jobs are rationed, with non-
whites and women at the end of the 
queue, the evidence presented in this 
paper is unconvincing. In three of four 
cases, the inverse Mill's ratio is statistically 
insignificant, and, in any case, a negative 
ratio can be explained in a variety of 
ways.2 
Further, the sign of the Mill's ratio is  
1. For example, see Ruhm (1987). 
2. The negative sign indicates that reemployed 
individuals have lower expected wages than those 
unemployed at the survey date but says nothing 
about the process generating this result. 
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quite sensitive to the type of earnings 
function estimated, with small changes in 
specification causing the variable to switch 
from significantly negative to positive.3 A 
better strategy would be to look for labor 
market rationing directly—by focusing, 
for example, on discouraged workers, 
involuntary part-time employment, and 
instances of repeated job turnover. 
Addison and Portugal (A&P) present 
the first analysis of prior notification on 
post-separation joblessness, using micro 
data from a nationally representative 
sample. Table 1, which shows hazard and 
failure rates, is particularly interesting. It 
indicates that prior notification reduces 
joblessness by around a month—primarily 
by increasing the probability that workers 
become reemployed without intervening 
unemployment. 
A&P do not point out that for workers 
experiencing positive levels of unemploy-
ment, there is essentially no difference between 
the notified and non-notified groups. For 
example, 83.5 percent of notified workers 
with some joblessness are unemployed at 
least four weeks, 72.1 percent for eight or 
more weeks, and 62.0 percent for thirteen 
or more weeks. For non-notified workers, 
the corresponding percentages are 83.7, 
70.5, and 62.7 percent. Given this surpris-
ing finding, I wish that greater effort had 
been made to determine the mechanisms 
by which prior notification assists workers 
in mOVing directly to new jobs without 
experiencing unemployment. 
I find it difficult to interpret A&P's  
3. Regressions showing these results are available 
upon request.  
hazard regressions. For example, given 
that the primary impact of prior notifica-
tion occurs prior to the layoff date, it is 
correct, by definition, but provides little 
new information to observe that the 
receipt of unemployment benefits attenu-
ates the impact of prior notification. 
Workers able to avoid unemployment will 
not receive benefits; those who are unsuc-
cessful experience joblessness similar to 
that of their non-notified counterparts. 
I also wish that A&P had acknowledged 
several weaknesses in the DWS for their 
study. Where their hazard model assumes 
that post-displacement unemployment oc-
curs in a single spell, the survey data do 
not permit them to distinguish between 
time out of the labor force and unemploy-
ment, nor can they tell whether joblessness 
occurs in a single spell or in multiple 
occurrences, punctuated by short periods 
of employment. The effect of unobserved 
worker heterogeneity also deserves more 
attention when interpreting the regression 
results ( particularly the interactions be-
tween unemployment benefits and prior 
notification or job tenure). Finally, it 
would have been useful to broaden the 
analysis to include partial (as well as total) 
plant shutdowns. 
The three papers in this volume provide 
important information on worker adjust-
ment to permanent job terminations, but 
much remains to be done. Until our 
understanding becomes more complete, 
policy makers should be cautious about 
accepting the "conventional wisdom" about 
who suffers the most from labor displace-
ment and how they can best be helped. 
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